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Abstract
A common sales tactic is for a seller to encourage a potential customer to make her
purchase decision quickly. We consider a market with sequential consumer search in
which firms often encourage first-time visitors to buy immediately, either by making
an “exploding offer” (which permits no return once the consumer leaves) or by offering
a “buy-now discount” (which makes the price paid for immediate purchase lower
than the regular price). Prices often increase when these policies are used. If firms
cannot commit to their sales policy, the outcome depends on whether consumer incur
an intrinsic cost of returning to a firm: if there is no such return cost, it is often an
equilibrium for firms to offer a uniform price to both first-time and returning visitors;
if the return cost is positive, however, firms are forced to make exploding offers.
Keywords: Consumer search, oligopoly, price discrimination, high-pressure selling,
exploding offers, buy-now discounts, costly recall.
1 Introduction
Selling techniques are rarely a focus of economic research, although they are an important
aspect of the consumer experience in many markets. One important and controversial sales
technique attempts to force the consumer to decide quickly whether to buy, before she has
time to consider the product in depth or before she has time to explore other options
available in the market. In his account of sales practices, Cialdini (2001, page 208) reports:
Customers are often told that unless they make an immediate decision to
buy, they will have to purchase the item at a higher price later or they will be
∗This paper replaces an earlier paper titled “Conditioning prices on search behavior”. We are grateful
for their helpful comments to Simon Anderson, Marco Haan, Bruno Jullien, Preston McAfee, Meg Meyer,
Nicola Persico, Andrew Rhodes, David Sappington, Glen Weyl, Chris Wilson and Asher Wolinsky, and to
the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) and the British Academy for their funding assistance.
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unable to purchase it at all. A prospective health-club member or automobile
buyer might learn that the deal offered by the salesperson is good for that one
time only; should the customer leave the premises the deal is off. One large
child-portrait photography company urges parents to buy as many poses and
copies as they can afford because “stocking limitations force us to burn the
unsold pictures of your children within 24 hours”. A door-to-door magazine
solicitor might say that salespeople are in the customer’s area for just a day;
after that, they, and the customer’s chance to buy their magazine package, will
be long gone. A home vacuum cleaner operation I infiltrated instructed its sales
trainees to claim that, “I have so many other people to see that I have the time
to visit a family only once. It’s company policy that even if you decide later
that you want this machine, I can’t come back and sell it to you.”
Likewise, Bone (2006, pp. 71-73) documents how a home improvement company offers
its potential customers a regular price for the agreed service, together with a discounted
price–which was termed a “first call discount”–if the customer agrees to buy immedi-
ately.
There are other settings where similar tactics might plausibly be used. One can imagine
a sales assistant in an electronics store offering a customer a 10% discount if the sale is
made immediately (e.g., before the assistant “leaves for the day”). When searching for
air-tickets online, a consumer may find a quote on one website, go on to investigate a
rival seller, only to return to the original website to find the price has mysteriously risen.
An academic journal may offer to publish a scholar’s paper as is, if the scholar submits
it immediately before trying her luck with another outlet. A seller of life insurance may
give a quote to a consumer which is valid only for 10 days, knowing that it will take the
consumer more than 10 days to generate another quote (given the medical tests required).
This paper examines a seller’s incentive to encourage its potential customers to buy
quickly. Two reasons why a seller might encourage immediate purchase are (i) to pre-
vent the customer from going on to investigate other, perhaps superior, deals available in
the market, and (ii) to prevent the customer from adequately evaluating the seller’s own
product. For the most part we investigate the former reason, which requires the seller
to operate alongside rivals. (The second reason can be examined in a simple monopoly
setting, as we will do at the end of the paper.) As indicated by Bone and Cialdini, methods
of encouraging quick sale include a seller telling the potential customer that she will have
to pay higher price if she decides to purchase at a later date (in this paper we then say
the seller offers a “buy-now discount”), or the seller may refuse to sell to a customer at all
unless she buys immediately (a sales tactic for which we use the term “exploding offer”).1
1We use a model with rational consumers. There are many other methods to induce sales which rely on
more psychological factors. These include attempts to make the prospective buyer “like” the seller (e.g.,
by claiming similar interests, families or social background) or attempts to make the buyer feel obligated
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We employ a model of sequential consumer search with horizontal product differen-
tiation to pursue our analysis. In markets in which consumers search through available
options, it is common for a consumer to return to buy from a previously sampled seller (if
the seller permits this) after investigating other sellers.2 Of course, to implement a policy
of exploding offers or buy-now discounts, a seller needs to be able to distinguish potential
customers it meets for the first time from those who have returned after a previous visit.
A sales assistant may tell from a potential customer’s questions or demeanor whether she
has paid a previous visit or not, or may simply recognize her face. In online markets, a
retailer using tracking software may be able to tell if a visitor using the same computer has
visited the site before. Sometimes–as with job offers, tailored financial products, medical
insurance, or home improvements–a consumer needs to interact with a seller to discuss
specific requirements, and this process reveals the consumer’s identity. In these situations
where sellers can distinguish new from returning visitors, we argue that firms often have
an incentive to discriminate against returning visitors.
In our search model, there are potentially two reasons why a firm may wish to dis-
criminate against returning visitors. First, there is a strategic reason, which is to deter a
potential consumer from going on to investigate rival offers. If a consumer cannot return
to a seller once she leaves, this increases the opportunity cost of onward search, as the
consumer then has fewer options remaining relative to situation in which return is costless.
Second, the observation that a consumer has come back to a seller after sampling other op-
tions reveals relevant information about a consumer’s tastes, and this may be a profitable
basis for price discrimination. A seller may charge a higher price to those consumers who
have already investigated other sellers, because their decision to return indicates they are
unsatisfied with rival products.3 However, this incentive is tempered by the fact that re-
turning consumers also do not have a strong taste for the firm’s own product, for otherwise
they would have purchased immediately instead of going on to investigate alternatives.
to the seller (e.g., by means of a “free gift”). Cialdini (2001) describes these and other sales techniques
in more detail, and Bone (2006) illustrates their use in the two companies he studies. Bone (page 90)
describes the use of an extreme tactic: the seller “burst into tears” when the sale appeared in difficulty,
claiming she would be in trouble with her boss if she didn’t make the sale.
2De los Santos (2008) presents a rare empirical study of consumer search behaviour prior to making a
purchase, using data from online book purchases. De los Santos (2008, section 4) finds that three-quarters
of consumers search only one retailer before making their purchase. Of the remaining consumers who
search at least twice, approximately two-thirds buy from the final firm searched and one-third go back
to a firm searched earlier. De los Santos also finds that the initial search is non-random, and one firm
(Amazon.com) was sampled first by about two-thirds of all consumers making a purchase.
3This contrasts with the substantial literature about how firms can use the information of consumer
purchase history to refine their prices. These models often predict that a firm will price low to a customer
who previously purchased from a rival (or consumed the outside option in the case of monopoly), since
such a customer has revealed she has only a weak preference for the firm’s product. See Fudenberg and
Villas-Boas (2006) for a survey of this literature.
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In section 2 of the paper, we suppose that firms can employ one of just two “buy-
later” policies: consumers can freely return after leaving the firm (and buy at the same
price), or exploding offers are used and first-time visitors are forced to buy immediately or
never. We derive the equilibrium price when all firms use exploding offers, and show with
examples that typically this price is (weakly) higher than the corresponding price with free
recall. The use of exploding offers also leads to inefficient matching between products and
consumers. When a firm uses an exploding offer, this makes those consumers with strong
tastes for the firm’s product more likely to buy immediately, but it prevents consumers
with moderate tastes from returning after they find nothing better elsewhere. We show
that firms wish to use exploding offers when the consumer demand curve is concave, while
when demand is convex firms choose to allow free recall. In this setting, only the strategic
reason to make return costly is present, as by construction firms make no sales to returning
visitors when exploding offers are used.
In section 3 we assume firms have a richer set of buy-later policies to choose from,
and rather than simply banning return they can charge returning visitors a higher price;
that is, they offer first-time visitors a buy-now discount. Starting from a situation in
which firms treat first-time and returning consumers equally, we show under relatively
mild conditions–essentially, that the demand curve be strictly logconcave–that a firm
has an incentive to offer a buy-now discount. We also show that a firm wishes to set only
a “moderate” buy-later price which induces some of its initial visitors to return to buy.
In a duopoly example, we calculate the equilibrium prices for immediate and returning
purchase, and find that the buy-now discount is largest when intrinsic search frictions are
small. Because of the extra search frictions introduced by the buy-now discount, even the
discounted buy-now price is higher than the non-discriminatory price. As such, this form
of price discrimination lowers both consumer surplus and total welfare.
In section 4 we relax the assumption that firms can commit to their buy-later policies
when consumers make their first visit. The outcome without commitment depends sen-
sitively on whether or not consumers face an intrinsic (as opposed to artificially inflated)
cost of returning to a firm. If there is no such cost, we show that it is an equilibrium for
firms to offer uniform prices when the demand curve is convex, i.e., the fact that a con-
sumer has come back to a firm after sampling other sellers gives no ex post incentive for the
firm to surprise its returning visitors with a price rise. This implies that the informational
incentive to set higher prices to returning customers is non-existent, and it is the strategic
impact on a consumer’s incentive to buy immediately which is the dominant factor when
a firm decides to make return costly. Thus, an inability to commit to its buy-later policy
can reduce a firm’s incentive to discriminate against return visitors.
However, it is usually more realistic to suppose that consumers have at least a small
intrinsic cost of returning to a previously-visited firm. Then, for reasons akin to Diamond’s
(1971) famous paradox, the only credible outcome is that firms make exploding offers and
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the return market collapses. With intrinsic costs of return, then, an inability to commit
to its buy-later policy will amplify a firm’s incentive to discriminate against its returning
visitors. In addition, if a firm has limited commitment power, in the sense that it can
commit to an upper bound on the prices paid by returning visitors–this upper boundmight
simply be the displayed price of the item in the store, for instance–then an equilibrium
exists which is identical to the full commitment outcome in section 3.
Finally, in section 5 we adjust the analysis so that a consumer needs time to evaluate
properly the current firm’s offer, rather than to discover the offers made by rivals in the
market. We show that if the marginal cost of supply is sufficiently small relative to the
product’s expected utility, a firm has an incentive to use high-pressure sales techniques
which force a consumer to reach her decision before she has time to fully evaluate the
product. (This is true both in a monopoly and in a competitive search context.) The
result is that consumer surplus is fully extracted, and, in the search context, consumers
are matched only randomly with products.
Our paper relates to several strands of the industrial organization literature. Our
underlying framework is a sequential search model with horizontally differentiated products
in which consumers search both for price and product fitness, as introduced by Wolinsky
(1986). Each firm has two sources of demand: consumers who buy its product on their first
visit to the firm (“fresh demand”), and consumers who sample the firm, go on to sample
rival products, but eventually come back to buy (“returning demand”). In Wolinsky’s
model, firms cannot distinguish between these two groups and so must treat all visitors
equally, while in our paper firms are able to discriminate between the two groups.
Our paper is complementary to the model of ordered search in Armstrong, Vickers, and
Zhou (2009). The two papers use the same Wolinsky framework and focus on the same
distinction between fresh and returning demand, but there are two major differences. First,
Armstrong et al. suppose that firms know something about their place in the consumer
search order and can set their prices accordingly, while for the most part in this paper
we assume random search whereby firms do not know where they are in a consumer’s
search process. Second, Armstrong et al., like Wolinsky, assume that firms cannot directly
distinguish between fresh and returning visitors and must treat both groups equally, while
the ability to distinguish between the two groups lies at the heart of the current analysis.
In Armstrong et al., a firm which is more “prominent” is predicted to set a lower price
than its less prominent rivals. (If a firm is far back in the search order, it knows that any
consumer who reaches it must not care for the products of its rivals, and so this firm has
monopoly power over its consumers.) This reflects the informational motive to set high
prices to consumers who have already sampled, and rejected, rival products.
Our analysis is related to models of search with (exogenous) costly recall. Janssen and
Parakhonyak (2010) extend Stahl’s (1989) model so that consumers incur an exogenous
cost to return to a previous firm. This stopping rule is significantly more complicated than
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when return is costless. When there are more than two firms, a consumer’s stopping rule
is non-stationary and her reservation surplus level depends on her previous offers. They
further show that equilibrium prices do not depend on the recall cost (unlike our model,
where prices are sensitive to the endogenously generated recall costs).4
Firms often benefit from a reduction in consumer search intensity, since this usually
softens price competition. In our model, the buy-now discount or exploding offer serves
this purpose. Alternatively, Ellison and Wolitzky (2008) extend Stahl’s model so that a
consumer’s incremental search cost increases with her cumulative search effort. If a firm
increases its in-store search cost (say, by making its tariff harder to comprehend), this will
make further search less attractive. They show that if the exogenous component of search
costs falls, firms will unilaterally increase their self-determined element of search costs, with
the result that equilibrium prices are unchanged. Though otherwise very different, our
model and theirs study how search frictions are determined endogenously: even if intrinsic
search frictions are negligible, a market may suffer from substantial search frictions–and
high prices–in equilibrium. Rotemberg (2010) presents a model with non-sequential search
in which sellers, by investing in sales effort, can directly affect a prospective buyer’s utility
from the seller’s item or her disutility from not buying the seller’s item. (In his model,
buyers can differ in their propensity to be persuaded, and sellers can differ in their degree
of altruism towards their customers.)
Our analysis of buy-now discounts is also somewhat related to the literature on auctions
with a “buy now” price (see Reynolds and Wooders, 2009, for instance). Online auctions
sometimes offer bidders the option to buy the item immediately at a specified price rather
than enter an auction against other bidders. In these situations, a seller has one item to
sell to a number of potential bidders, and so a bidder needs to pay a high buy-now price in
order to induce the seller from going on to search for other bidders by running an auction,
whereas our model involves sellers offering a low buy-now price so as to induce a buyer
from going on to search for other sellers. Common rationales for buy-now prices in auctions
are impatience or risk-aversion on the part of bidders, neither of which is needed in our
search framework.
As far as we know, our paper is the first to study the use of exploding offers in consumer
markets. In the alternative setting of matching markets, however, there are a number of
studies in which exploding offers play a role. Exploding offers are often used in specialized
labor markets, such as those for law clerks, sports players, medical staff, and student
4Daughety and Reinganum (1992) make the point that the extent of consumer recall may be endoge-
nously determined by firms’ equilibrium strategies. In their model, the instrument that a firm can use
to influence consumer recall is the length of time that it will hold the good for consumers at the quoted
price. In contrast to our assumption that a consumer can discover a seller’s buy-later policy only after
investigating that seller, Daughety and Reinganum suppose that sellers can announce their recall policies
to the population of consumers before search begins.
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college allocations.5 When exploding offers are used, these markets have a tendency to
“unravel”, and employers compete to make earlier offers (Li and Rosen, 1998). The result
can be significant inefficiency. Niederle and Roth (2009) run an experiment to measure the
impact of a policy which bans the use of exploding offers in a laboratory matching market.
They find that firms do tend to use exploding offers when they are permitted to do so, and
the result is that matching occurs inefficiently early and match quality is poor, relative to
the situation in which exploding offers cannot be used.
2 Exploding Offers
Our underlying model of the market is based on Wolinsky (1986). (See Anderson and
Renault, 1999, for further development of Wolinsky’s model.) There are n ≥ 2 firms in the
market, each supplying a single horizontally differentiated product at a constant marginal
cost which is normalized to zero. There are a large number of consumers with idiosyncratic
preferences, and their measure is normalized to one. A consumer’s valuation of product
i, ui, is a random draw from some common distribution with support [0, umax] and with
cumulative distribution function F (·) and density f(·). We suppose that the realization of
match utility is independent across consumers and products. In particular, there are no
systematic quality differences across the products. Each consumer wishes to buy one item,
provided an item can be found with a positive surplus. We sometimes refer to the function
1− F (·) as the consumer demand curve.
Consumers initially have imperfect information about the deals available in the market.
They gather this information through a sequential search process, and by incurring a search
cost s ≥ 0, a consumer can visit a firm and find out (i) its price, (ii) its “buy-later” policy,
and (iii) the realized match value.6 In this section, the only two buy-later policies available
to a firm are to use an exploding offer or to allow free recall. To implement an exploding
offer, firms are assumed to be able to distinguish first-time visitors from returning customers
and to have the ability to commit not to serve a returning customer. (If a firm allows free
recall, it sets the same price to first-time visitors and returning visitors.) After visiting
one firm, a consumer can choose to buy at this firm immediately or to investigate another
firm (her sampling is without replacement). If permitted, she can costlessly return to a
previous firm after sampling subsequent firms.7 Since firms are ex ante symmetric, we
5Roth and Xing (1994, page 1001) document some examples of high-pressure job offers. For instance,
in the market for judicial clerkships, some judges use exploding offers which would be withdrawn if they
are not accepted in some very short time, or even during the telephone conversation itself.
6If the search cost is zero, we require that consumers nevertheless consider products sequentially.
7In most markets, even if firms allow for free recall, consumers may face some intrinsic returning costs.
In most of our analysis, introducing a relatively small returning cost does not affect results qualitatively,
but only complicates the analysis. We assume it away for analytical convenience. However, when we come
to discuss buy-now discounts without commitment in section 4, whether an intrinsic returning cost exists
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focus on symmetric situations with random search, so that a consumer is equally likely to
investigate any of the remaining unsampled firms when she searches.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the first stage, firms set prices and buy-later
policies simultaneously. The strategy space of each firm is then R+×{free recall, exploding
offer}. At the second stage, consumers search sequentially and make their purchase decision
after search is terminated. Consumers do not observe firms’ actual choices before they
start searching, but hold rational expectations of equilibrium prices and buy-later policies.
Information unfolds as the search process goes on, but consumers’ beliefs about the offers
made by unsampled firms are unchanged, even if they observe off-equilibrium offers from
some firms. Both consumers and firms are assumed to be risk neutral. We use the concept
of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and focus on symmetric pure strategy equilibria in which
firms set the same price and buy-later policy based on their expectation of consumers’
search behavior, and at each firm consumers hold equilibrium beliefs about unsampled
firms and make their search decisions accordingly.
A piece of notation which summarizes the distribution of match utilities and the extent
of search frictions is
V (p) ≡
∫ umax
p
(u− p) dF (u)− s . (1)
Thus, V (p) is the expected surplus of sampling a product if a consumer expects that the
price will be p, the cost of sampling the product is s, and this is the only product available.
Note that V (p) is decreasing but p + V (p) is increasing in p. Throughout this paper we
assume that the search cost s is relatively small, so that
V (p¯) > 0 , (2)
where p¯ is the monopoly price which maximizes p[1 − F (p)].8 This condition means that
consumers are willing to sample a product sold even at the monopoly price. In the example
where u is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], which we sometimes use for illustration in the
following analysis, condition (2) requires s < 1
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2.1 The free-recall benchmark
If all firms allow free recall, the situation is as in Wolinsky (1986). For reference later,
in this section we recapitulate part of his analysis. Wolinsky shows that in a symmetric
equilibrium in which all firms set the same price p0, consumers have a stationary stopping
rule whereby they buy a product immediately if they obtain a match utility u greater
than a threshold a, and if no product yields that level of utility, the consumer samples all
products and buys from the best of the n options provided that one option generates a
or not will make an important difference.
8If the demand curve 1− F is logconcave, p¯ solves the first-order condition p¯ = 1−F (p¯)f(p¯) uniquely.
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positive surplus. Here, the reservation utility a is determined by the formula
V (a) = 0 . (3)
The expression
∫ umax
a
(u− a) dF (u) in V (a) is just the incremental benefit of engaging in
one more search if the best current utility is a and the consumer can freely return to this
best offer if the next product does not yield higher surplus. So the optimal threshold makes
the consumer indifferent between searching on, which incurs the cost s, and purchasing this
product with utility a. Since V (·) is a decreasing function, (3) has a unique solution and
a decreases with s. Condition (2) is therefore equivalent to a > p¯.
Given that other firms are charging the equilibrium price p0, if firm i deviates and
charges p˜, its demand is
Q =
1− F (a)n
n(1− F (a)) [1− F (a− p0 + p˜)] +
∫ a
p0
F (u)n−1f(u− p0 + p˜)du . (4)
To understand this expression, consider the two sources of firm i’s demand. Suppose firm
i is in the kth position in a consumer’s search order. Then to reach the firm, the consumer
must have sampled, and rejected, k − 1 firms first, which occurs with probability F (a)k−1
(since a consumer will buy immediately if uj ≥ a). If k < n, the consumer will buy
immediately at firm i if ui − p˜ ≥ a− p0, which occurs with probability 1− F (a− p0 + p˜).
If the firm is in the final search position (i.e., k = n), then she will surely buy from firm
i if ui − p˜ ≥ a − p0, since then her surplus ui − p˜ is positive and higher than all other
firms. Since firm i is equally likely to be in any of the search positions, the firm’s demand
from this source is [1− F (a− p0 + p˜)]× 1n [1 +F (a) +F (a)2+ · · ·+F (a)n−1], which yields
the first term in (4). The second source of demand comes from the scenario in which the
consumer searches all sellers and does not find any product with net surplus greater than
a − p0. This consumer will then buy from the firm with the greatest net surplus, if this
surplus is positive. The fraction of consumers for whom this happens and then go on to
buy from firm i is
Pr(max
j =i
{0, uj − p0} < ui − p˜ < a− p0) =
∫ a−p0+p˜
p˜
F (ui − p˜+ p0)n−1dF (ui) ,
which equals the second term in (4) by changing variables from ui to u = ui + p0 − p˜.
In equilibrium, firm i maximizes p˜Q by choosing p˜ = p0, and so expression (4) implies
the first-order condition for p0 to be the equilibrium price is
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1− F (p0)n
p0
= f(a)
1− F (a)n
1− F (a) − n
∫ a
p0
F (u)n−1f ′(u)du . (5)
9Anderson and Renault (1999) show that, if 1− F is logconcave, the equilibrium price is increasing in
the search cost s and decreasing in the number of firms (see their Proposition 1). (However, Anderson
and Renault assume that all consumers buy one product, i.e., there is no outside option, and this affects
the first-order condition for the equilibrium price.) It is a subtle issue in this model whether second-order
conditions are satisfied in this candidate equilibrium. For discussion, see Proposition B2 in Anderson and
Renault (1999). However, a sufficient condition is that the density function f be weakly increasing.
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Assuming that the demand curve 1−F is strictly logconcave (i.e., the distribution for the
match utility has an increasing hazard rate), a finite number of firms, and condition (2),
one can show that in the relevant interval 0 < p0 < a, expression (5) has a unique solution,
and the equilibrium price lies in the range
1− F (a)
f(a)
< p0 < p¯ . (6)
As the number of firms becomes infinite, the equilibrium price converges to p0 =
1−F (a)
f(a)
.
As the search cost tends to its upper bound in (2) (i.e., as a tends to p¯), consumers stop
searching whenever they find a product with positive surplus and each firm acts as a
monopolist, so the equilibrium price converges to p0 = p¯ (which then also equals
1−F (a)
f(a)
).
In the remainder of section 2, we extend this model to allow firms to use the additional
instrument of exploding offers; that is to say, firms can require first-time visitors to buy
their product immediately or not all. We discuss this issue in two stages: first, we analyze
equilibrium prices under an assumption that all firms use exploding offers, and second, we
discuss when firms do indeed have an incentive to use this sales tactic.
2.2 Equilibrium prices with exploding offers
Suppose now that all firms force their first-time visitors to buy immediately or not at all.
Suppose consumers anticipate that each firm sets the same price p. What is a consumer’s
optimal search strategy? As we will show, and as is intuitive, consumers become less
choosy as they run out of options, and their reservation utility for purchasing decreases
the more firms they have already sampled. Indeed, if they are unfortunate enough to reach
the final firm they will have to accept any offer which leaves them non-negative surplus.
The stopping rule is formally described in this result:
Lemma 1 Suppose all firms use exploding offers and set the same price p < p¯. Then a
consumer who has 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1 unsampled firms remaining will buy from the current
firm if and only if her current match utility satisfies u ≥ am, where am solves the first-order
difference equation
am+1 = am + V (am) (7)
with a0 = p and V (·) defined in (1).
This stopping rule for search without recall has been derived in, for example, Lippman
and McCall (1976). It can be understood as follows. If a consumer has reached the last
firm (i.e., m = 0), she will buy if the last product has utility no less than p, so a0 = p.
Suppose the stopping rule holds for m ≤ n − 1, i.e., the consumer will buy if her current
match utility satisfies u ≥ am when she has m options remaining. Then am − p is her
expected surplus from participating in a no-recall search market with m products each
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sold at price p. Now consider the situation when the consumer faces m + 1 unsampled
products. If she searches on and if the next product has utility greater than am, then she
will buy the next product, while if the next product’s utility is below am, she will continue
to search and so obtain expected surplus am − p. Hence,
am+1 − p =
∫ umax
am
(u− p)dF (u) + (am − p)F (am)− s ,
which simplifies to (7) using the definition of V (·).
Compared to the case with free recall, the optimal stopping rule in the no-recall case
exhibits several distinct features. First, whenever V (p) > 0 such that a1 > a0 = p, it
follows from (7) that am+1 > am for all m ≥ 0, so that a consumer is willing to accept a
less suitable product as she nears the end of the search process.10 In particular, it is possible
that a consumer will end up purchasing a product with lower match utility than a product
she previously rejected. While with free recall the optimal stopping rule is stationary, and
am ≡ a given in formula (3). That is, consumers do not become less choosy as they near
the end of the search process. Second, unlike the case with free recall, each am depends
on price p since the starting value a0 does so. Finally, realize from (7) that the difference
am+1 − am decreases with m, and the sequence am converges to the free-recall reservation
utility a as m→∞ (at least when s > 0 or when u has bounded support).
We next derive the symmetric equilibrium price. Suppose n − 1 firms set the price p
and one firm is considering its choice of price, say p˜. (Of course, when choosing their search
strategy consumers anticipate that this firm has set the equilibrium price p.) Suppose this
deviating firm happens to be in the kth position of a consumer’s search process, so there
are n − k firms remaining unsampled. Then the probability that the consumer will visit
this firm is h1 ≡ 1 if k = 1, and if k > 1 this probability is
hk ≡
k−1∏
i=1
F (an−i) . (8)
She will then buy at this firm if u− p˜ > an−k−p, which has probability 1−F (an−k−p+ p˜),
and so the firm’s demand given it is in a consumer’s kth search position is
hk[1− F (an−k − p+ p˜)] . (9)
Since the firm is in any position 1 ≤ k ≤ n with equal probability, its total demand with
price p˜ when all other firms are expected to set price p is
Q =
1
n
n∑
k=1
hk[1− F (an−k − p+ p˜)] ,
10In the alternative setting of matching markets, an applicant for a job (say) may also be reluctant to
search for long because the desirable vacancies may quickly be filled.
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and its profit is p˜Q. The firm’s profit is concave in its price p˜ if (but not only if) each
function p˜[1− F (an−k − p + p˜)] is concave in p˜. A sufficient condition for this is that the
demand curve 1− F (·) is concave.
Therefore, the first-order condition for p to be the equilibrium price is
p =
∑n
k=1 hk[1− F (an−k)]∑n
k=1 hkf(an−k)
. (10)
Since each an−k depends on p, this equation defines p only implicitly.
As with the free-recall case, if 1−F is strictly logconcave, the number of firms is finite
and condition (2) holds, expression (10) has a solution in the range11
1− F (a)
f(a)
< p < p¯ .
Note that assumption (2) implies that consumers are indeed willing to participate in the
market. It can be shown that as the number of firms tends to infinity, this equilibrium
price converges to the same lower bound 1−F (a)
f(a)
as in the free-recall case. Intuitively, when
the number of firms is unlimited, a consumer would never choose to return to a previously
sampled firm, even if she could freely do so, and so the use of exploding offers then has no
effect on the equilibrium price. It is also clear that as the search cost tends to its upper
bound (i.e., as a tends to p¯), p converges to the monopoly price p¯.
At this level of generality, it is hard to compare market performance with and without
the use of exploding offers, and the comparison between the prices in (5) and in (10) is
opaque. To gain further insights consider the case of a uniform distribution for match
utility. (In section 2.3, we will show that with the uniform distribution it is an equilibrium
for all firms to use exploding offers.)
Uniform example: If u is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], so that the demand curve is
linear, then (7) implies
am+1 =
1
2
(a2m + 1)− s
starting with a0 = p. This difference equation appears to have no analytical solution. It
converges as m becomes large to a = 1−√2s, the free-recall threshold. Except when n is
small, equation (10) has no analytical solution, but it can be solved numerically. The solid
curve in Figure 1a depicts how the equilibrium price p varies with the number of firms
when s = 0. The dashed curve represents the corresponding price (5) in the free-recall
11Focus on the relevant range 0 < p < a. Then we have an−k ∈ (p, a) for every k ≤ n−1. (Recall a0 = p,
and whenever p < a, am increases with m and converges to a as m → ∞.) Since (1− F )/f is a strictly
decreasing function, each 1−F (an−k)f(an−k) is between
1−F (a)
f(a) and
1−F (p)
f(p) (for k = n, it is equal to the latter),
and so is the right-hand side of (10), which establishes the claim. The uniqueness of the solution can be
established if the right-hand side of (10) is decreasing in p, which is true if the demand curve 1− F (·) is
concave (given each an−k increases with p).
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market. Both prices converge to zero for large n, but it seems that prices with exploding
offers are approximately double those which prevail with free recall. (This figure includes
the monopoly case n = 1, in which case the monopolist charges the price p¯ = 1
2
and the
use of exploding offers has no impact.) The difference between the two prices is greatest
for an intermediate numbers of firms. In the same example, Figure 1b shows that the
exploding-offer equilibrium has a higher profit level than the free-recall equilibrium except
when n = 2.12 Numerical calculations suggest that as the search cost gets larger, the
difference between the exploding-offer and free-recall prices decreases (and if s = 1
8
, the
difference vanishes).
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Figure 1a: Prices with exploding offers Figure 1b: Profits with exploding offers
In this uniform example, aggregate consumer surplus and total welfare (measured by
the sum of consumer surplus and profit) fall when firms use exploding offers. Consumer
surplus falls since the price rises compared to the free-recall situation and consumers are
prevented from returning to a product which yields positive surplus. (Even if p = p0,
i.e., if using exploding offers did not change the market price, consumers would obtain
lower surplus in the exploding-offer case due to the no-return restriction. The higher price
p > p0 only adds to their loss.) As far as total welfare is concerned, relative to the free-
recall situation, the use of exploding offers not only induces suboptimal consumer search
(i.e., consumers on average cease their search too early due to the “buy now or never”
requirement, resulting in sub-optimal matching), but also excludes more consumers from
the market, both of which harm efficiency.
Exponential example: To illustrate how the use of exploding offers need not increase
equilibrium prices, consider a second example in which F (u) = 1 − e−u/µ, where µ is the
expected value of match utility. The special feature of this distribution is that a monopoly
12The reason why industry profits increase with n for small n is that with few suppliers many consumers
will not find a product which yields them positive surplus. With monopoly, for instance, half of consumers
are excluded from the market, while with many firms almost all consumers will eventually find a suitable
product. But with more firms profits fall with n, as the price reduction effect outweighs this market
expansion effect.
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firm facing this population of consumers, where each consumer has an outside option with
utility z ≥ 0, will choose the same price p = µ regardless of z.13 When firms use exploding
offers, this immediately implies that each firm will choose p = µ, regardless of the number
of firms and the search cost (as long as s is relatively small such that consumers are willing
to enter the market). One can also show that the same price is chosen when there is free
recall, so that p0 = µ solves expression (5) in this example for all n and a. Thus, the use
of exploding offers has no impact on equilibrium prices. Nevertheless, this sales technique
harms both consumers and firms, as demand and match quality are artificially restricted
by the requirement that consumers cannot return to a firm. We will see in the next section
that firms faced with this demand curve will not choose to use exploding offers.14
2.3 Incentives to use an exploding offer
Here we discuss when the behaviour discussed in the previous section is in fact an equi-
librium. That is, if all its rivals set the price p in (10) and make exploding offers, does a
firm have an incentive to deviate and allow free recall (and, possibly, set a different price
as well)? Before pursuing the analysis in detail, consider this simple duopoly example with
fixed prices which yields the main insight.
Suppose there are two firms, both of which set the exogenous price p < a. Is a firm’s
demand boosted or reduced if it decides to force its first-time visitors to buy immediately
or not at all? First, for those consumers who first sample its rival, firm i’s decision whether
or not to use an exploding offer has no impact on its demand. Therefore, the only impact
on the firm’s demand comes from that half of the consumer population who sample it
first. If firm i allows free recall, such a consumer will buy from it immediately whenever
ui > a, and a consumer will return to buy from it whenever p < ui < a and ui > uj. This
pattern of demand is depicted in Figure 2a below. If, instead, firm i uses an exploding offer,
expression (7) implies that a consumer will buy from it if and only if ui > a1 = p + V (p).
This pattern of demand is depicted in Figure 2b.
As discussed in section 2.2, a1 ∈ (p, a) and so the use of an exploding offer makes
a consumer more likely to buy immediately, but it eliminates all the returning demand.
One can calculate that when u is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], firm i’s demand in the
two figures is identical, and when a firm forces immediate sale this has no net impact on
its demand. More generally, the impact of using an exploding offer is to eliminate the
firm’s demand from “low ui” consumers, who have match utility close to price p and might
13This is the “memoryless” property of the exponential distribution. With price p, the monopolist will
sell to a consumer if u − p ≥ z, and so will choose p to maximize pe−(p+z)/µ, a choice which does not
depend on z.
14While we have been unable to make progress in comparing prices with and without exploding offers with
general distributions for match utility, numerical simulations confirm that for a wide range of distributions
prices are higher when exploding offers are employed. (We conjecture that this is true provided 1− F is
strictly logconcave.)
14
otherwise come back, and to boost its demand from “high ui” consumers, who do not
wish to risk losing the existing desirable option by going on to sample the rival. If u has
an increasing density (i.e., the demand curve is concave), the latter effect dominates the
former, and the net impact of forcing immediate sale is to boost a firm’s demand. Similarly,
if the demand curve is convex, then the former effect dominates and demand is reduced
when an exploding offer is used.
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Figure 2a: Demand with free recall Figure 2b: Demand with exploding offer
The next result proves that this insight is valid with an arbitrary finite number of firms
and endogenous prices.15
Proposition 1 Suppose the number of firms is 1 < n <∞.
(i) If the demand curve 1−F is strictly concave then every symmetric equilibrium involves
firms using exploding offers;
(ii) If the demand curve 1−F is strictly convex then every symmetric equilibrium involves
firms allowing free recall;
(iii) If the demand curve 1−F is linear, i.e., u is uniformly distributed, then an equilibrium
with exploding offers and an equilibrium with free recall both exist.
(All omitted proofs can be found in the appendix.)
Thus, we see there are plausible cases when exploding offers are used in equilibrium, as
well as other plausible cases (such as the exponential distribution considered above which
15Note that if there were unlimited firms in the market (n = ∞), banning return or artificially raising
the cost of return has no impact on a firm’s profit. As is well known, with unlimited options, consumers
would not choose to return to a previously sampled option even if it was free for them to do so. As such,
equilibria with exploding offers and with free recall will exist for any match utility distribution.
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results in convex demand) when a firm prefers to let consumers return freely after sampling
rival products. In the uniform example at least (see Figure 1a), the use of exploding offers
leads to higher prices being chosen in equilibrium. In these situations, firms choose to use
exploding offers and yet consumers are harmed by the practice.
Nevertheless, our analysis covers only situations with concave or convex demand (i.e.,
where the density for the match utility is monotonic). The reason why results are then
so clear-cut is that the impact of exploding offers on a firm’s demand is unambiguous,
regardless of the prevailing price. With a non-monotonic density function, whether ex-
ploding offers are an equilibrium sales technique may depend on price. In particular, it
may depend both on the number of firms in the market and the size of the search cost.
A second factor which could come into play with non-monotonic densities is that firms
may choose intermediate buy-later policies, which make return costly for their first-time
visitors but not prohibitively so. For example, online sellers can ask customers to log on to
their accounts or input information again; firms can ask consumers to queue again or make
another appointment if they want to come back. With a monotonic density, a firm wishes
either to make return impossible or free, even if it could impose intermediate returning
costs.
As can be seen from the proof of Proposition 2 below, when we start from the free-recall
equilibrium with price p0, introducing a small return cost boosts a firm’s demand if∫ a
p0
F (u)n−1f ′(u)du > 0 . (11)
Whether this condition holds for non-monotonic densities depends both on the number of
firms and the search cost. Consider for example aWeibull distribution with F (u) = 1−e−u3
defined on [0,∞), which has a hump-shaped density with mode around 0.87. If the search
cost is high enough that a is smaller than the mode, then (11) always holds. With a low
search cost such that a = 2, say, then condition (11) always fails and free recall is the
equilibrium outcome. However, if the search cost is moderate so that a = 1, then condition
(11) holds for n = 2 and 3 but fails for n ≥ 4. In this case, firms with few rivals have an
incentive to make return costly, while a more competitive market will allow free recall.
In some markets consumers search in a non-random order, and a prominent seller may
attract a disproportionate share of initial consumer searches. (Recall that De los Santos
(2008) showed how this was so in the online book market. Likewise, a doorstep seller
for, say, vacuum cleaners or home improvements, is relatively like to be the first seller
encountered by the consumer.) It turns out that prominence does not affect a firm’s
incentive to adopt exploding offers, at least when the demand curve is concave or convex.
The reason can be understood by looking at Figure 2 for the duopoly case. The decision
about whether or not to use an exploding offer only affects a firm’s demand from those
consumers who sample it first, and this demand effect is positive (negative) if the demand
curve is concave (convex), independent of the proportion of such consumers.
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3 Buy-Now Discounts
An alternative framework allows a firm to charge a higher price to returning visitors instead
of the drastic measure of banning return. Consider the same model as before, except that
instead of choosing the extreme policies of either allowing free return or no return, each
firm can choose two distinct prices: pˆ is the price for returning customers and p is the
price for first-time visitors, and the strategy space of each firm is R+×R+. (Neither price
is observable to consumers before they start searching.) Whenever pˆ > p, returning to
a previous firm is costly.16 Indeed, when pˆ is sufficiently high, the firm in effect makes
exploding offers. One interpretation of this discriminatory pricing is that each firm sets a
regular (or “buy-later”) price pˆ and offers first-time visitors a “buy-now” discount τ ≡ pˆ−p.
We assume for now that a firm can commit to pˆ when it offers new visitors the buy-now
price p.
3.1 Incentives to offer a buy-now discount
In this section we analyze when a firm unilaterally has an incentive to offer a buy-now
discount τ , starting from the situation in which all firms offer the equilibrium uniform
price p0 in expression (5). As a preliminary result, we observe that the impact of offering
a small buy-now discount on a firm’s profit is just as if the firm levies a small buy-later
premium:
Lemma 2 Starting from the situation in which all firms offer the equilibrium uniform
price p0 in (5), the impact on a firm’s profit of offering a small buy-now discount τ (so
its buy-now price is p0 − τ and its buy-later price is p0) is equal to the impact of levying a
buy-later premium τ (so its buy-now price is p0 and its buy-later price is p0 + τ).
Proof. Suppose all but one firm choose the uniform price p0 in (5). If the remaining
firm offers the buy-now price p and buy-later price p+τ , denote this firm’s profit by π(p, τ ).
If p ≈ p0 and τ ≈ 0 we have the first-order approximation
π(p, τ ) ≈ π(p0, 0) + (p− p0)πp(p0, 0) + τπτ (p0, 0)
= π(p0, 0) + τπτ (p0, 0) , (12)
where the equality follows from the assumption that p0 is the equilibrium uniform price
and subscripts denote partial derivatives. It follows that the impact on the firm’s profit is
captured by the term τπτ (p0, 0), independent of p, which implies the result.
16If pˆ < p, then a consumer has an incentive to leave a firm and then return, even if she has no intention
of investigating other firms. If this kind of consumer arbitrage behavior–of stepping out the door and
then back in again–cannot be prevented, then setting pˆ < p is equivalent to setting a uniform price pˆ,
and so without loss of generality we assume firms are constrained to set pˆ ≥ p.
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Intuitively, the fact that p0 is the equilibrium uniform price implies that a firm’s profit is
not affected by small changes in its uniform price, and the only impact on a firm’s profit
comes from its buy-now discount τ (regardless of whether this is interpreted as a discount
for immediate purchase relative to the buy-later price p0, or as a premium for later purchase
relative to the buy-now price p0).
To illustrate the pros and cons of offering a discount most transparently, consider
initially the case of duopoly. It is somewhat more straightforward to consider the incentive
to set a buy-later premium, and then to invoke Lemma 2. If firm i introduces a buy-
later premium, this has no impact on its demand and profit from those consumers who
first sample the rival given they hold equilibrium beliefs, and so we can restrict attention
to that portion of consumers who sample firm i first. A buy-later premium not only
discourages consumers from searching on, as the exploding offer did in the earlier analysis,
but also generates extra revenue from returning consumers.
How does τ affect a consumer’s decision whether to buy immediately from firm i?
Denote by a(τ ) the reservation utility which leads the consumer to buy immediately, i.e.,
if she finds match utility ui ≥ a(τ) at the firm she will buy without investigating the rival.
Clearly if no premium is levied (τ = 0) then a(0) = a, the free-recall reservation level in
(3). By definition, if a consumer discovers utility ui = a(τ ) at firm i she is indifferent
between buying immediately (thus obtaining surplus a(τ )−p0) and going on to investigate
firm j, which yields expected utility∫ umax
a(τ)−τ
(uj − p0)dF (uj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility when she buys from j
+ F (a(τ)− τ)[a(τ)− p0 − τ ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility when she returns to buy from i
− s . (13)
To understand expression (13), note that if the consumer finds utility uj at the rival, she
will buy from that firm if uj − p0 ≥ a(τ ) − p0 − τ , and otherwise she will return to buy
from firm i (but at the higher price p0+ τ). Equating a(τ )− p0 with expression (13) yields
the following formula for a(τ ) given τ :
V (a(τ)− τ ) = τ . (14)
(Remember V (·) is defined in (1), and given τ this equation has a unique solution a(τ).)
The pattern of demand for those consumers who first sample firm i is illustrated in Figure
3.17
17This analysis and Figure 3 presume that some consumers do return to firm i after sampling firm j,
which requires that the premium τ is not too large. By examining the figure, one sees that the exact
condition is a(τ) > p0 + τ . From (14), and noting that V (·) is a decreasing function, this is equivalent to
τ < V (p0). This is the case for sufficiently small τ as long as V (p0) > 0, which is true given (2). When
the discount exceeds V (p0), the returning cost is so great that the consumer never returns to a firm once
she leaves it (i.e., the firm in effect uses an exploding offer).
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Note that a(τ ) decreases with τ , and by differentiating (14) we obtain
a′(τ ) =
−F (a(τ)− τ)
1− F (a(τ )− τ ) < 0 . (15)
This is intuitive, as raising the cost of returning makes a consumer more likely to buy
immediately (just as in the extreme case of exploding offers).
Using Figure 3, the fraction of those consumers who sample firm i first and who actually
buy from the firm is
1− F (a(τ )) +
∫ a(τ)
p0+τ
F (u− τ)f(u)du .
By using (15), the derivative of firm i’s demand with respect to τ is equal to
∫ a(τ)
p0+τ
F (u− τ)f ′(u)du . (16)
In particular, the firm’s demand is boosted with a buy-later premium whenever the density
is increasing, as we saw when we discussed exploding offers in section 2.3.
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Figure 3: Pattern of demand when firm i levies buy-later premium τ
Firm i makes revenue p0 from each of its customers, and an additional τ from each of
its returning customers. It follows that the derivative of firm i’s profits with respect to τ
evaluated at τ = 0 is ∫ a
p0
F (u) [f(u) + p0f
′(u)] du . (17)
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Here,
∫ a
p0
Ffdu is the extra revenue generated from the returning customers while
∫ a
p0
Ff ′du
is the extra (maybe negative) demand generated by increasing the cost of return.
From (17) and Lemma 2, the firm has an incentive to introduce a buy-now discount
if the density f is increasing, i.e., whenever the demand curve is concave. But it has
an incentive to introduce a discount much more generally, and the incentive is present
whenever p0 in (5) is strictly above
1−F (a)
f(a)
. To see this, use (5) to obtain
p0
∫ a
p0
F (u)f ′(u)du =
1
2
[
p0f(a)
1− F (a)(1− F (a)
2)− (1− F (p0)2)
]
> −1
2
[
F (a)2 − F (p0)2
]
= −
∫ a
p0
F (u)f(u)du ,
where the inequality follows from the assumption that p0 >
1−F (a)
f(a)
. Thus, expression (17)
is positive and a firm has a unilateral incentive to offer a buy-now discount.
Part (i) of the next proposition shows that this results holds for an arbitrary (finite)
number of firms, while part (ii) shows that firms do not wish to set such a large buy-later
price that no consumers ever return.
Proposition 2
(i)Starting from the free-recall equilibrium with uniform price p0 in (5), a firm has a uni-
lateral incentive to offer first-time visitors a buy-now discount if p0 >
1−F (a)
f(a)
.
(ii) Starting from the exploding-offer equilibrium with price p in (10), a firm has a unilateral
incentive to offer a buy-later price low enough to induce some first-time visitors to return.
As discussed in section 2, a sufficient condition to ensure p0 >
1−F (a)
f(a)
is that the demand
curve is strictly logconcave and that the number of firms is finite.
Part (i) of Proposition 2 indicates that a seller typically has an incentive to offer a
first-time visitor a discount on the regular price if the consumer buys immediately. The
intuition for this result is as follows. As Lemma 2 shows, the impact of a small buy-now
discount is the same as a small buy-later premium. A small buy-later premium has two
effects: the extra revenue effect (every returning consumer now pays a premium) and the
demand effect (first-time visitors become more likely to buy immediately, but potential
returning consumers are less likely to come back). The second effect is similar to the
demand effect caused by exploding offers, and whether it is positive or negative depends
on the shape of the demand curve. However, the first revenue effect must be positive.
Part (i) shows that this first effect is powerful enough for the overall effect to be positive
under a mild condition on the demand curve. Part (ii) shows that a firm prefers to set a
“moderate” buy-later price, rather than such a high buy-later price that none of its initial
visitors returns. The intuition is that a firm can enjoy the strategic benefits of exploding
offers but also generate some additional revenue if it charges returning visitors a high price
instead of banning returning altogether.
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3.2 Equilibrium buy-now discounts in an example
The previous result indicated that firms typically have an incentive to offer a buy-now
discount. In this section we report the equilibrium discount and price in a duopoly example
in which match utility ui is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and compare this outcome to
the situation with uniform prices.18 (The calculation is straightforward but lengthy; see
our working paper Armstrong and Zhou (2010) for details, together with calculations for
non-uniform distributions for match utility.)
We focus on symmetric equilibrium in which the buy-now price is p and the buy-later
price is pˆ. To ensure an active market we assume s < 1
8
. First, we can show that the use
of buy-now discounts leads to higher prices, i.e., p0 < p < pˆ. That is, even the discounted
buy-now price in the discriminatory case is higher than the uniform price, and the ability
to offer discounts for immediate purchase drives up both prices.19 The intuition is that the
buy-now discount adds to the intrinsic search frictions in the market, and this allows firms
to charge a higher price. (Relative to the uniform-price case, consumers become less willing
to search on, and so the firms’ demand is less price elastic.) Figure 4a below depicts how
the three prices vary with the search cost s, where from the bottom up the three curves
represent p0, p and pˆ, respectively. As is expected, both the uniform price p0 and the
buy-now price p increase with the search cost. Less expected is the observation that the
buy-later price pˆ depends non-monotonically on s (and is always above the monopoly price
p¯ = 1
2
in this example).
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Figure 4b: Profits and search cost
Second, the equilibrium buy-now discount τ (the distance between the upper curve and
the middle curve in Figure 4a) decreases with the search cost s. That is, the higher is
18It appears to be hard to characterize the equilibrium buy-now discount equilibrium for an arbitrary
number of firms, as we were able to do in our discussion of exploding offers. When there are more than two
firms, the consumer stopping rule with buy-now discounts is non-stationary and depends on the history
of realized match utilities, and this makes the equilibrium analysis complex. (When exploding offers are
used, by contrast, the stopping rule does not depend on previous offers, since the consumer has no ability
to return.)
19It is not unusual that the ability to price discriminate in oligopoly leads to a fall in all prices, but cases
where all prices rise are less familiar.
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the intrinsic search cost, the less incentive firms have to deter consumers from searching
on. In particular, when s = 0, we have p ≈ 0.45 and pˆ ≈ 0.51, and so τ ≈ 0.06. In this
case, although the market has no intrinsic search frictions, firms in equilibrium impose
“tariff intermediated” search frictions on consumers via the buy-now discount, which here
is about 12% of the buy-later price. By contrast, in a market with s = 1
8
, which is the
highest intrinsic search cost which induces consumers to participate, we have p = pˆ = 1
2
and τ = 0, so that there is no buy-now discount. (When s = 1
8
, search costs are so high
that consumers will accept the first offer which yields them a non-negative surplus. In
particular, there are no returning consumers even with costless recall.)
Third, since both prices rise, the buy-now discount equilibrium excludes more con-
sumers from the market. In addition, as is expected, the use of buy-now discounts boosts
fresh demand and reduces returning demand. This is illustrated for the case s = 0 in Table
1 (including for reference the case where exploding offers are used).
p pˆ fresh returning excluded
no discount 0.41 0.41 41% 41% 17%
with discount 0.45 0.51 66% 11% 23%
exploding offer 0.45 n/a 73% 0% 27%
Table 1: The impact on prices and demand of buy-now discounts and exploding offers
However, whether the use of buy-now discounts leads to higher profit depends on the
magnitude of the search cost. Figure 4b shows how industry profits with uniform pricing
(the dashed curve) and profits with buy-now discounts (the solid curve) vary with the
search cost s. We see that price discrimination leads to higher profit only if the search cost
is relatively small. When the search cost is relatively high, price discrimination leads to
prices which exclude too many consumers. In these cases, firms are engaged in a prisoner’s
dilemma: when feasible an individual firm wishes to offer a buy-now discount, but when
both do so industry profits fall. Nevertheless, as was seen in the exploding offer analysis
in Figure 1b above, when there are more than two firms we anticipate that profits will rise
when buy-now discounts are used, since the price-increasing effect will then outweigh the
market participation effect. (When there are many firms, most consumers will eventually
find a product they buy.) Finally, for similar reasons in the exploding-offer case, aggregate
consumer surplus and total welfare fall when firms use buy-now discounts.
4 Buy-Later Policies Without Commitment
The preceding analysis has assumed that a firm can commit to its buy-later policy–be it an
exploding offer or a buy-later price–when consumers first visit. In this section we discuss
the plausibility of this assumption, and discuss whether firms will continue to discriminate
against return visitors when they have less commitment power.
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4.1 Exploding offers
Our analysis in section 2 relied on a firm’s ability to commit to an exploding offer. If a
consumer does come back to a firm after sampling a rival, the firm will have an incentive to
sell to that consumer.20 This credibility problem is enhanced by the fact that consumers
often will wish to return to previous firms, since their stopping rule is such that their
remaining option may have lower utility than previously rejected options. In markets where
the commitment problem is hard to avoid, firms will be unable to implement exploding
offers. However, the problem can sometimes be at least partially solved. First, in a dynamic
environment sellers may be able to gain a reputation for sticking to exploding offers. In
labour market settings, for instance, some employers may be known to keep their word.
Second, in some business to business transactions, the seller may be able to offer a contract
to the buyer which stipulates that the offer will not be available, or a higher price will be
charged, if the buyer comes back after a specified time. Third, for those less extreme selling
techniques which impose non-monetary returning costs on consumers, commitment seems
easy to achieve. For example, a financial advisor can credibly ask a customer to make an
appointment again if she wants to come back later.
Even if firms lack any ability to commit, firms may wish to claim to employ exploding
offers if a fraction of consumers are “credulous”. When some consumers mistakenly believe
a seller’s claim that they must buy immediately or not at all, then Proposition 1 still
applies. To see this, notice that the other rational consumers will always ignore what
the sellers say about their buy-later policies and behave as in the free-recall case. So
the decision about whether to use exploding offers or not depends only on the credulous
consumers who behave just as the consumers analyzed in the full commitment case in
section 2. While the proportion of credulous consumers does not affect the incentive to use
exploding offers (at least when the demand curve is convex or concave), this proportion
will affect the equilibrium price when exploding offers are used.21
Alternatively, in the buy-now discount model in which firms set higher prices to return-
ing visitors rather than banning their return, we show next that if firms cannot commit
to their buy-later price then exploding offers are the only credible equilibrium whenever
consumers face a positive intrinsic cost of returning to a firm. This argument holds for
arbitrary demand curves (including those which are convex).
20Indeed, the quote from Cialdini in the introduction immediately goes on to say: “This, of course, is
nonsense; the company and its representatives are in the business of making sales, and any customer who
called for another visit would be accommodated gladly.”
21A conceptual issue arising in such a model with both rational and naive consumers is how they form
their expectation of equilibrium prices. Our discussion here implicitly assumes that all consumers somehow
hold the correct expectation about prices.
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4.2 Buy-now discounts
We discuss next whether buy-now discounts are used if we relax the assumption that a firm
can commit to its buy-later price when consumers first visit. The basic game structure is
the same as before, except that now when a consumer discovers a firm’s buy-now price,
she can only form some belief about its buy-later price (the belief is of course required to
be correct in equilibrium). The actual buy-later price can be learned only after she returns
to the firm.
Here, unlike the rest of the paper, it makes an important difference whether or not
consumers face an intrinsic returning cost when they come back to a previously-visited
firm. Since in most situations such a returning cost does exist, we initially consider this
case. (In the analysis with full commitment in sections 2 and 3, the presence of a small
intrinsic return cost makes no qualitative difference, and for simplicity we assumed this
cost was precisely zero.)
Positive intrinsic return cost: Suppose consumers face an intrinsic returning cost when
they come back to a previously sampled firm. Proposition 3 describes the outcome when
firms cannot fully commit to their buy-later price:
Proposition 3 Suppose consumers face a positive intrinsic returning cost.
(i) If firms cannot commit to their buy-later price, in equilibrium no consumers return to
a previously-visited firm and the equilibrium price is as described in section 2.2.
(ii) If firms can commit to an upper bound on their buy-later price, then firms in any
equilibrium will choose their buy-later price to equal the upper bound, and the outcome is
as if firms can fully commit to their buy-later prices as described in section 3.
Proof. (i) Denote by r > 0 the intrinsic returning cost. Suppose in some equilibrium
that each consumer forecasts that a firm’s buy-later price is pˆ(pi) when its buy-now price
is pi, where pˆ(·) can take any form. Suppose that the buy-now price in this equilibrium
is p∗, say, and suppose–contrary to the claim–there is some returning demand in this
equilibrium. But if a consumer returns to firm i after sampling other firms, her match utility
must satisfy ui ≥ pˆ(p∗)+ r, since the consumer needs to pay the returning cost r. Since all
its returning customers have match utility at least as great as pˆ(p∗)+ r, the firm’s optimal
price for these customers must be at least pˆ(p∗) + r. This is because charging returning
consumers pˆ(p∗) + r will not induce any of them to leave this firm again and buy from
others (since going back to any other firm also involves a returning cost r), while charging
them a price below that cannot increase demand (since the deviation is not public). We
thus obtain a contradiction to the assumption that pˆ(p∗) was the correctly anticipated buy-
later price. Therefore, in any equilibrium there are no returning consumers. The unique
equilibrium outcome is then that firms charge first-time visitors a price as described in the
exploding-offer equilibrium in section 2.2, and charge returning consumers a sufficiently
high price such that consumers never come back to previously sampled firms.
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(ii) Suppose now that firms can commit to an upper bound on the price they will charge
returning visitors. Suppose that firm i charges the buy-now price pi and commits to an
upper bound on its buy-later price given by pˆi. Then any consumer who returns to buy
from firm imust expect that the firm will actually charge price pˆi. (Suppose to the contrary
that a returning consumer anticipates that the firm will actually charge price p˜ < pˆi. Then,
following the same logic as in part (i) of this proof, firm i then has an incentive to increase
its buy-later price above p˜ since it knows that the consumer is willing to pay at least p˜+ r
for the product. Therefore, the only equilibrium belief can be that returning consumers
anticipate that firms will set their buy-later price equal to their announced upper bound.)
The firm has an incentive to raise the price above pˆi, as in the proof to part (i), but that is
not feasible given that the firm commits to its cap. Hence, firm i will charge its returning
customers exactly pˆi. We deduce that announcing an upper bound to the buy-later price
is equivalent to committing to an actual buy-later price at the level of the cap, and so the
analysis of section 3 can be applied.
Thus, part (i) shows that if firms cannot commit to their buy-later price and if there is
an intrinsic returning cost (no matter how small), rational consumers anticipate that buy-
later prices will be so high that it is never worthwhile to return to a previous firm after
leaving it. In effect, firms are forced to make exploding offers, and consumers have just
one chance to buy from any firm. Thus, the lack of commitment power strengthens, rather
than weakens, a firm’s temptation to exploit returning consumers. This result is analogous
to Diamond’s (1971) paradox, showing how a small search cost can cause a market to shut
down. Diamond’s result relies on consumers knowing their match utility in advance, and a
central advantage of Wolinsky’s formulation with ex ante unknown match utilities is that
this paradox can be avoided. But even in our Wolinsky-type framework, the returning
consumers know their match utility, and so the returning market fails for the same reason
as the primary market failed in Diamond’s framework.
Of course, as shown in part (ii) of Proposition 2, a firm would like to avoid this complete
shut down of the return market if possible. One method, when feasible, is to commit to a
buy-later price cap. For instance, in most retailing markets the price printed on the price
label in the store usually has this commitment power, and a sales person has no authority
to increase the price above the displayed price. (Rather the shelf price is chosen at a
higher managerial level within the firm.) Similarly, as discussed in the introduction, the
firm in Bone’s (2006) study offered its potential customers a regular price (in the form of
a written quote) if they decided to buy later. Whenever this form of partial commitment
is feasible, part (ii) of the proposition shows that the equilibrium is the same as that in
the full commitment case of section 3. Thus, a cap on the buy-later price–which firms
can plausibly impose on themselves in many situations–can be used as a full commitment
device.
Notice that this buy-later price cap can also sustain the full commitment outcome when
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the intrinsic returning cost is zero, if consumers happen to have beliefs whereby they expect
a firm will set its buy-later price equal to its committed cap. (With a positive return cost,
this is the only rational belief.) However, as we discuss next, there are typically other,
perhaps more plausible, outcomes in that situation.
No intrinsic return cost: Now suppose that consumers face no intrinsic returning cost.
Although this situation is unrealistic, it has some theoretical interest. In this case, there
is often an equilibrium in which uniform pricing (as in the benchmark model in section
2.1) is a credible strategy, so that no buy-now discount is offered. That is to say, (i)
consumers do not anticipate that they will face a higher price if they return to buy from
a previously sampled firm and plan their search strategy accordingly, and (ii) when a
consumer does return to a firm, that firm has no ex post incentive to surprise the consumer
with an unexpected price hike. That this is so is easy to understand in the extreme case
with s = 0. When search costs are zero, consumers sample all firms before they purchase
(given their belief that there is no buy-later surcharge), and so all buyers are returning
customers. Thus, we are just in the situation of Wolinsky model with zero search costs, and
the incentive to set the price to returning consumers is exactly the same as the incentive
to set the uniform price p0 in the s = 0 version of expression (5).
More generally we have the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose firms cannot commit to the buy-later price and consumers face
no intrinsic returning cost. Then uniform pricing is an equilibrium outcome whenever the
demand curve is weakly convex.
Proposition 4 echoes Proposition 1, and in both situations when firms face a convex de-
mand curve they offer the same deal to all their potential customers. The intuition is that
when the buy-later premium is not anticipated by first-time visitors, it loses its strategic
benefit of deterring consumers from further search. At the same time, the informational
effect is also relatively weak: given a consumer comes back to a firm when she does not
expect to pay a returning purchase premium and dose not need to pay an intrinsic return-
ing cost, her taste for this firm’s product cannot be too strong (for otherwise she would
have purchased immediately), although she dislikes other products even more. Under the
conditions of Proposition 4, the informational motive to raise prices to return visitors is
precisely zero.
Proposition 4 also suggests an alternative outcome which may emerge under the “price
cap” regime discussed in Proposition 3. There, we suggested that when a firm commits to
an upper bound on its buy-later price, there is an equilibrium in which consumers believe
that sellers will set the price at this upper bound if they return. Alternatively, however, a
consumer who has been offered a discount at a store on a first visit may well believe that
she will be able to negotiate the same discount should she return. Formally, her belief is
then that the buy-later price will be the same as the buy-now price. With these beliefs,
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and when there is no intrinsic return cost, Proposition 4 shows that firms will not set their
buy-later price at the level of their indicated price cap, and instead will offer the “discount”
uniformly to all visitors. Therefore, when there are no intrinsic return costs and firms can
commit to a buy-later price cap, there are at least two equilibria: one where consumers
believe that firms will charge the same price on a return and a first visit, and one where
consumers believe the discount will be available only on the first visit.
5 Prevent Learning About Firm’s Own Product
The focus of this paper has been on a seller’s strategic incentive to prevent a consumer
from acquiring information about rival offerings. By making it hard to return to a firm,
a consumer is reluctant to go on to investigate other deals. An alternative form of high-
pressure selling is to force a potential customer to buy quickly, before she has had a chance
to evaluate the current product adequately. If a seller forces consumers to decide quickly
(or offers a discount if they buy quickly), a consumer might have to decide whether or not
to purchase before she has worked out how much she actually wants the product. Without
accurate information about the realized match utility, suppose that a consumer bases her
purchase decision on the expected match utility, which is u¯, say.
This issue can be analyzed within a monopoly framework (unlike our main model).
Suppose the monopolist has marginal cost c for supplying the product. If the seller gives
the consumer time to calculate her (privately observed) match utility u, the seller’s profit
with price p is (p−c)(1−F (p)), and the optimal price maximizes this expression. If instead
the seller forces the consumer to buy immediately, knowing only her expected utility, the
seller can charge p = u¯ and obtain profit u¯−c. Since u¯ > p(1−F (p)) for all p, it follows that
the latter strategy is more profitable whenever c is sufficiently close to zero. By contrast, if
c is sufficiently large (above u¯, for instance), then the monopolist prefers to give consumers
enough time to understand the realized match utility.22
One can also consider a search version of this problem. Consider the Wolinsky model,
but suppose a consumer’s initial search is costless so that consumers are willing to par-
ticipate in the market. When the marginal production cost c is small enough, it is an
equilibrium for all firms to force sales before the consumer discovers her utility and to fully
extract expected utility with the monopoly price p = u¯. (Suppose all other firms do so.
Then when a consumer arrives at a seller, she will never search further. So the seller acts as
a monopolist and, as we have seen, its most profitable strategy is then to force a quick sale
to conceal match-specific information.23) Even with small search costs, then, all firms en-
22For further details of the monopolist’s incentives to reveal or conceal match-specific information, see
Lewis and Sappington (1994). They show that the monopolist typically will choose to reveal all information
or none. Anderson and Renault (2009) discuss when a firm wishes to disclose match-specific information
to consumers about a rival ’s product.
23If c is large enough (above u¯, say), this high-pressure selling equilibrium cannot be sustained.
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gage in this form of high-pressure selling, with undesirable results: consumers are left with
no surplus; even low-u consumers buy, despite the costs of serving them, and consumers
are randomly matched with sellers rather than buying the most suitable product. Thus,
if firms have the ability to conceal match-specific information by means of high-pressure
sales techniques they will often choose to do so, and the Diamond Paradox emerges again.
6 Conclusions
This paper has explored the incentives firms have to discourage consumer search by making
it costly for consumers to return after investigating rival sellers. The use of exploding offers
can be individually profitable for firms under certain conditions, such as when the demand
curve is concave. A less extreme policy is to offer first-time visitors a buy-now discount,
and firms have an incentive to offer such discounts under the relatively mild condition that
the demand curve is strictly logconcave. Either selling technique tends to raise market
prices and lower both consumer surplus and total welfare. If firms cannot commit to their
buy-later price the outcome depends on whether there is an intrinsic cost of returning to a
firm: if the intrinsic return cost is zero, it is often an equilibrium for firms to offer the same
price to all potential customers; if the intrinsic return cost is positive, firms are forced to
make exploding offers.
As demonstrated in this paper, high-pressure selling can limit a consumer’s ability to
make a well-informed decision, which in turn can harm market performance. Public policy
has attempted to address this problem. For instance, the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive (adopted in 2005 across the European Union) prohibits in all circumstances
“Falsely stating that a product will only be available for a very limited time, or that it
will only be available on particular terms for a very limited time, in order to elicit an
immediate decision and deprive consumers of sufficient opportunity or time to make an
informed choice.” However, the enforcement of such laws is often difficult. Often a more
efficient method to tackle the issue is to restore a consumer’s freedom of choice using
other, indirect, means. For example, exploding offers could in essence be prohibited by
mandating a “cooling off period”, so that consumers have the right to return a product in
some specified time after agreeing to purchase. (They could then return a product if they
subsequently find a preferred option.) Many jurisdictions impose cooling off periods for
some products, especially those sold in the home.
To end, we point out reasons why sales tactics which disadvantage returning visitors
are not seen in all markets, even when their use is permitted. Proposition 4 may provide
one theoretical explanation why in some markets uniform prices offered to both first-time
and returning visitors, even when firms can distinguish first-time from returning visitors.
Alternatively, a “behavioral” reason why firms do not surcharge their returning customers
is that many consumers could be antagonized by an unexpected price rise, and decide to
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buy elsewhere. But first and foremost, many retailers, especially in the traditional bricks-
and-mortar sector, cannot distinguish first-time from returning visitors. Shopping in a
supermarket, say, is unlikely to involve much contact with sales personnel at all, and there
is no mechanism by which the firm can detect first-time from returning visitors. More
generally, consumers may be able to conceal their search history (e.g., by deleting cookies
on their computer). Thus, if firms discriminate against return visitors and if it is costless
to pretend to be a new visitor, consumers will do this, and the market will operate as a
standard search market with uniform prices.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Part (i): Our proof consists of two steps. First, we show that
if the match utility density f is strictly increasing, then all firms using exploding offers is
an equilibrium. Second, we exclude the possibility that all firms allowing free recall is also
an equilibrium.
The hypothesis is that all firms choose to use exploding offers and to set the price p
in (10). Suppose a deviating firm chooses price p˜ and allows free recall, while other firms
follow the proposed equilibrium strategy. Suppose that the deviating firm is in the kth
position of a consumer’s search process and k < n. (If k = n then allowing free recall or
not does not affect the firm’s demand.) Then the probability that this consumer will visit
the firm is still hk in (8), since consumers hold equilibrium beliefs. However, her incentive
to search beyond the firm is now altered. Since she can return to this firm whenever she
wants, she becomes more willing to continue searching. If at the deviating firm she finds
utility u such that u− p˜ ≤ 0, she will never buy from the firm (either immediately or later).
So consider the situation where u − p˜ > 0. Then if she leaves the deviating firm, she will
enter a no-recall search market with n − k products each being sold at price p, but now
with an outside option u− p˜. To calculate the consumer’s stopping rule in this situation,
we need to calculate her expected surplus from entering such a search market.
Denote by Wm(z) the expected surplus from a no-recall search market with m unsam-
pled products with price p and outside option z ≥ 0. It is difficult to derive an explicit
expression for Wm(z), and instead we use an indirect method.
24 Let rm(z) be the proba-
bility that the consumer will eventually consume the outside option. By standard envelope
reasoning we have the following result.25
24By contrast, it is straightforward to derive an explicit expression for consumer surplus in the case of
free recall–see expression (22) below.
25A sketch of a proof goes as follows. Let Θm be the set of all possible stopping rules in the no-recall
search market with m products and outside option z. If the consumer uses θ ∈ Θm, her expected surplus
is zR(θ) + U(θ), where R(θ) is the probability that the consumer will opt for z given the stopping rule
θ, and U(θ) is the surplus from buying other products (including the expected search costs). Thus,
Wm(z) = maxθ∈Θm [zR(θ) + U(θ)] and rm(z) = R(θ(z)), where θ(z) is the optimal stopping rule given z.
Wm(z) is convex since the objective function is linear in z, and its derivative is rm(z) almost everywhere.
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Claim 1 Wm(z) is convex and W
′
m(z) = rm(z) almost everywhere.
Notice thatWm(0), the expected surplus from a no-recall search market with a zero outside
option, is just am − p. Thus, we have
Wm(z) = am − p+
∫ z
0
rm(x)dx .
Since 0 < rm(z) ≤ 1, Wm(z) is an increasing function with slope no greater than one. In
addition, since the consumer can always consume the outside option without searching at
all, we have Wm(z) ≥ z. In particular, for a sufficiently large z (e.g., z ≥ umax − p), the
consumer will consume the outside option immediately, so Wm(z) = z. Hence, we can
deduce that Wm(z) = z and rm(z) = 1 for z ≥ zm, where zm = inf{z : Wm(z) = z} and
zm ∈ (am − p, umax − p). For z < zm, the consumer will search and so rm(z) < 1.
When the deviating firm occupies the kth position in a consumer’s search order, the
consumer will buy from it immediately if and only if u−p˜ ≥ Wn−k(u−p˜), i.e., if u−p˜ ≥ zn−k,
where zn−k, according to its definition, satisfies
zn−k = an−k − p+
∫ zn−k
0
rn−k(x)dx . (18)
Thus, the firm’s demand when it is in the kth position, charges price p˜ and permits free
return, is
hk
[
1− F (zn−k + p˜) +
∫ zn−k+p˜
p˜
rn−k(u− p˜)f(u)du
]
= hk
[
1− F (zn−k + p˜) +
∫ zn−k
0
rn−k(u)f(u+ p˜)du
]
, (19)
where the equality follows after changing variables in the integral. Compared to the demand
generated with an exploding offer given in (9), it now has reduced immediate demand since
zn−k > an−k − p, but has positive returning demand comprised of the integral term.
Claim 2 Demand in (19) is smaller than that in (9) if f is strictly increasing.
Proof. We need to show∫ zn−k
0
rn−k(u)f(u+ p˜)du < F (zn−k + p˜)− F (an−k − p+ p˜) . (20)
Define
φ(u) ≡ zn−k + p˜−
∫ zn−k
u
rn−k(x)dx .
Note that φ′(u) = rn−k(u), φ(zn−k) = zn−k + p˜, and φ(0) = an−k − p + p˜ (which follows
from (18)). Then the right-hand side of (20) can be written as∫ zn−k
0
rn−k(u)f(φ(u))du .
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Since φ(u) > u + p˜ (because rn−k(x) < 1 for x < zn−k), expression (20) holds if f is an
increasing function.
Therefore, for any price p˜, unilaterally allowing free recall causes the deviating firm’s
demand (and hence profit) to fall when f is increasing. (This is true regardless of the firm’s
position in a consumer’s search order, except when it is in the final position in which case
the use of exploding offers makes no difference to the firm’s demand.) It follows that an
equilibrium in which all firms use exploding offers exists.
The second step is to exclude the possibility of a free-recall equilibrium when f is
strictly increasing. We show that, starting from the hypothetical free-recall equilibrium
with price p0, each firm has a unilateral incentive to use an exploding offer no matter what
position it is in the consumer’s search process (except when it is in the final position).
As in expression (4), a firm’s demand, if it is in the kth position of the consumer’s search
process with k < n, is
F (a)k−1[1− F (a)] +
∫ a
p0
F (u)n−1f(u)du . (21)
The first term is demand when the consumer buys the firm’s product immediately, and the
second term is demand when the consumer first leaves the firm but eventually comes back.
Suppose now that the firm unilaterally uses an exploding offer but still charges the price p0.
(We will show the firm’s profits increase with this deviation, and hence the hypothetical
equilibrium is not valid. The firm’s profits would increase still further if it altered its price
as well.) Define δ ≡ max{0, u1− p0, · · · , uk−1− p0}. Then the consumer will visit the firm
if and only if δ < a−p0. If she finds match utility u at the firm, she will buy (immediately)
if u− p0 is greater than the expected surplus from searching further.
Denote by Vm (z) the expected surplus from participating in a free-recall search market
with m products offered at price p0 and an outside option z < a− p0. Then26
Vm (z) = z +
∫ a
z+p0
[1− F (u)m]du . (22)
One can check that z ≤ Vm (z) < a− p0.
26The consumer will stop searching before she runs out of options if and only if she finds a product with
match utility greater than a. (This is true regardless of z provided that z < a− p0.) Her expected surplus
is therefore
Vm (z) = [1− F (a)m] · [E (u|u ≥ a)− p0] + Pr (u∗ < a) ·E [max{u∗ − p0, z}|u∗ < a]− sT,
where u∗ = max{u1, · · · , um} and T = [1− F (a)m] / [1− F (a)] is the expected number of searches. The
first term is the surplus when the consumer ends up buying a product with match utility higher than
a, and the second term is the surplus when she ends up sampling all firms. From the definition of the
reservation utility a in (3), we have s = [1− F (a)] [E (u|u ≥ a)− a]. Substituting this into Vm(z) yields
the formula.
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The consumer will buy from firm i if and only if u − p0 ≥ Vn−k(δ). Here, δ is the
consumer’s outside option if the consumer leaves the firm and continues searching (since
the firm is using an exploding offer). The c.d.f. of δ defined on [0, umax − p0] is G(δ) ≡
F (δ+p0)
k−1, which has a mass point at zero. Therefore, the deviating firm’s demand when
it is in the kth position is
Pr (δ < a− p0 and u− p0 > Vn−k(δ)) (23)
= G(0)[1− F (p0 + Vn−k(0))] +
∫ a−p0
0
[1− F (p0 + Vn−k(δ))]dG(δ)
dδ
dδ
= F (a)k−1[1− F (p0 + Vn−k(a− p0))] +
∫ a
p0
f(p0 + Vn−k(x− p0))V ′n−k(x− p0)F (x)k−1dx ,
where the second equality follows after integrating by parts and changing the integral
variable. According to the definition of Vm(·) in (22), we have Vn−k(a− p0) = a− p0 and
Vn−k(x− p0) = x− p0 +
∫ a
x
[1− F (u)n−k]du , V ′n−k(x− p0) = F (x)n−k .
Substituting these into (23) shows that the firm’s demand is
F (a)k−1[1− F (a)] +
∫ a
p0
F (x)n−1f
(
a−
∫ a
x
F (u)n−kdu
)
dx . (24)
Since a − ∫ a
x
F (u)n−kdu > x for x < a, one can see that if f is strictly increasing
(we actually only need f to be strictly increasing on [p0, a]), demand in (24) is strictly
greater than demand in (21). Therefore, the firm does have an incentive to deviate from
the supposed free-recall equilibrium. This completes the proof of part (i). Parts (ii) and
(iii) can be proved in a similar manner.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) We will show that a firm has an incentive to introduce a
small buy-later premium, and then invoke Lemma 2 to show that the firm also has an
incentive to offer a small buy-now discount. Compared to the duopoly case analyzed in
the main text, the additional analysis needed for the general n-firm case involves the extra
complexity of a consumer’s stopping rule. In particular, the consumer’s stopping rule at a
firm which offers a buy-later premium will depend on the history of offers she sees before
she encounters the firm, and this feature is absent in the duopoly analysis.
Let p0 be the price in the free-recall equilibrium defined by (5). Assumption (2) implies
that p0 < a. We first consider this hypothetical search problem:
A search problem: Suppose the consumer encounters firm i first, and is offered match
utility ui, the buy-now price p0, and a buy-later premium τ > 0 (so the buy-later
price at firm i is pˆ = p0+ τ .) Suppose she expects that all m remaining firms charge
price p0 < a and allow free recall, and suppose the consumer has an outside option
δ < a− p0. What is her optimal stopping rule at firm i?
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It is clear that (a) if ui ≥ a, the consumer will surely stop searching and buy at firm
i immediately (this is even true when τ = 0); and (b) if ui − p0 ≤ δ, then firm i’s offer
is dominated by the outside option and the consumer will not buy from the firm (either
immediately or later), and she will keep searching since δ < a− p0.
Now consider the intermediate case with ui − p0 ∈ (δ, a − p0). If the consumer buys
immediately at firm i, her payoff is ui − p0. If she leaves firm i, she will begin a free-recall
search process with m firms and an outside option
z = max{δ, ui − pˆ} < a− p0 .
(Recall she will pay the higher price pˆ > p0 if she returns to buy from firm i.) As before,
the expected surplus Vm(z) from entering this search market is given by (22). Given δ, z
is a function of ui and we can therefore regard Vm(z) as a function of ui: it is flat until
ui reaches δ + pˆ and then increases with ui with slope less than one. (Note that we are
considering the case with ui < a, so the slope cannot be equal to one.) Recall from (22)
that for z < a− p0, z < Vm(z) < a− p0.
Clearly, the consumer will buy immediately from firm i if and only if
ui − p0 ≥ Vm(max{δ, ui − pˆ}) . (25)
Given the properties of Vm(·), the equality of (25) has a unique solution am(τ) ∈ (δ+p0, a).
We conclude that the consumer will buy immediately from firm i if and only if ui ≥ am(τ ).
There are then two cases, depending on the size of the premium τ :
(a) If ui − p0 crosses Vm(z) at the flat portion, which occurs when δ + pˆ− p0 > Vm(δ)
or τ > Vm(δ)− δ, then
am(τ) = p0 + Vm(δ) , (26)
which does not depend on τ . In this case, the consumer will never return to firm i once
she leaves because ui − pˆ is dominated by δ. Therefore, τ is so large that firm i has no
returning demand.
(b) If ui− p crosses Vm(z) at the increasing portion, which occurs when τ ≤ Vm(δ)− δ,
then am(τ) is implicitly determined by am(τ )− p0 = Vm(am(τ)− p0 − τ), which from (22)
implies am(τ) satisfies
τ =
∫ a
am(τ)−τ
[1− F (u)m]du , (27)
which does not depend on p0 or δ. In particular, am(0) = a. Expression (27) is the
generalization beyond duopoly of our earlier formula (14). In this case, the consumer will
initially reject firm i’s offer if ui < am(τ ), but will come back to the firm after sampling the
remaining m firms if ui− pˆ > max1≤j≤m{δ, uj−p0}.27 Note that the assumption δ < a−p0
implies that Vm(δ)− δ > 0, and so case (b) is relevant for all sufficiently small τ > 0.
In sum, we deduce the following result:
27Note that once the consumer leaves firm i, she has the outside option z < a− p0 and so she will never
come back before sampling all the remaining m firms.
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Claim 3 In this hypothetical search problem, the consumer will buy from firm i imme-
diately if and only if ui ≥ am(τ), where am(τ) is defined in (26) if τ > Vm(δ) − δ and
otherwise am(τ) is defined in (27).
Finally, since Vm(δ)− δ is decreasing in δ, the condition τ > Vm(δ)− δ is equivalent to
δ ∈ (δτ , a− p0), where δτ solves
τ = Vm(δτ )− δτ =
∫ a
δτ+p0
[1− F (u)m]du (28)
if τ < Vm(0), and δτ = 0 otherwise. In particular, Vm(δ0) = δ0 = a− p0.
We now prove Proposition 2. Starting from the free-recall equilibrium with price p0,
suppose firm i unilaterally introduces a returning purchase premium τ > 0 but keeps the
buy-now price unchanged at p0. Suppose firm i happens to be in the kth position of the
consumer’s search process. If k = n, then τ has no impact on firm i’s profit. In the
following, we show that for any k < n, introducing a small premium τ > 0 is profitable for
the firm.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, let δ ≡ max{0, u1−p0, · · · , uk−1−p0} be the best offer
from the previous k − 1 firms. A consumer will visit firm i if δ < a− p0. If the consumer
arrives at firm i and discovers match utility ui and the buy-later premium τ (but still
holds the equilibrium belief about the remaining n−k firms’ policies), she faces the search
problem we have just analyzed with m = n− k, and her stopping rule will depend on her
best previous offer δ. Let us focus on a relatively small τ such that τ < Vn−k(0) and define
δτ as in (28) with m = n − k. Then if δ ∈ (δτ , a − p0), the reservation utility according
to (26) is an−k(τ ) = p0 + Vn−k(δ). In this case, the consumer will buy immediately if
ui ≥ an−k(τ ), and otherwise she will keep searching and never come back. Alternatively, if
δ ≤ δτ the reservation utility an−k(τ) is as given in (27) with m = n−k. In this case, even
if the consumer leaves firm i first (i.e., if ui < an−k(τ )), she will eventually come back after
sampling all remaining firms if ui − p0 − τ is greater than their offered surplus and the
outside option δ which represents the best offer among the previous k−1 firms. Explicitly,
firm i’s returning demand in this case is
Pr(max
j>k
{δ, uj − p0} < ui − p0 − τ < an−k(τ )− p0 − τ)
=
∫ an−k(τ)
p0+τ
F (ui − τ )n−1dF (ui) =
∫ an−k(τ)−τ
p0
F (u)f(u+ τ)du .
(Note δ is also a random variable with c.d.f. G(δ) = F (δ + p0)
k−1, and the second step
follows after changing the integral variable.) Therefore, firm i’s profit if it is in the kth
search position and charges the buy-later premium τ is
p0
∫ a−p0
δτ
[1− F (p0 + Vn−k(δ))] dG(δ) + p0G(δτ )[1− F (an−k(τ ))]
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+ (p0 + τ)
∫ an−k(τ)−τ
p0
F (u)n−1f(u+ τ)du . (29)
Note from (27) that
(1− a′n−k(0))(1− F (a)n−k) = 1 . (30)
By using the observations Vn−k(δ0) = δ0 = a− p0 and (30), the derivative with respect to
τ of firm i’s profit in (29) when it is in the kth position (with k < n), evaluated at τ = 0, is∫ a
p0
F (u)n−1[f(u) + p0f
′(u)]du , (31)
which generalizes the duopoly expression (17). Here,
∫ a
p0
F n−1fdu is the extra revenue
generated from the returning customers, while
∫ a
p0
F n−1f ′du is the extra demand generated
by increasing the cost of return. That (31) is positive when p0 >
1−F (a)
f(a)
follows the
argument given in the main text for duopoly. Since (31) is positive (and the same) for all
k < n, the proof of part (i) is complete.
(ii) We show that in the buy-now-discount model (where firms can commit to the
buy-later price), there is no equilibrium in which firms set such high buy-later prices that
no consumers return to previously visited firms. Suppose by contrast that there is an
equilibrium without returning demand. Let τ¯ be the minimum buy-later premium needed
for such an equilibrium. Then τ¯ satisfies
an−1 = p+ τ¯ , (32)
where p is the no-recall equilibrium price defined in (10). (Recall {am} is the sequence of
reservation utilities in the no-recall case.) To see this, notice that am is increasing in m
and so if a consumer does not want to go back to the first sampled firm (at which she was
most picky), she also does not want to go back to any other firm. That is, (32) implies
am < p+ τ¯ (33)
for any m ≤ n− 2.
Starting from the hypothetical equilibrium in which each firm sets a buy-later premium
τ¯ ,28 suppose firm i deviates and sets a buy-later premium τ¯ − ε where ε > 0 is sufficiently
small (but keeps its buy-now price p unchanged). First of all, realize that this small
deviation will not affect the search behavior of consumers who sample any other firm first
because of (33). Therefore, we focus on those consumers who sample firm i first.
Given a buy-later premium smaller than τ¯ , the consumer will become more likely to
search on at firm i. Let a˜n−1 > an−1 be the new reservation utility. For a small deviation,
a˜n−1 must satisfy
a˜n−1 − p = Wn−1(a˜n−1 − p− τ¯ + ε) . (34)
28The same argument applies if firms charge buy-later premia greater than τ¯ .
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The right-hand side is the expected surplus from participating a “no-recall” market with
n−1 firms and a positive outside option a˜n−1−p− τ¯ + ε which is available if the consumer
comes back to firm i.29 (Recall the notation Wm(·) introduced in the proof of Proposition
1.) Note that a˜n−1 → an−1 as ε→ 0. Let a˜n−1 ≈ an−1+θε be the first-order approximation
of a˜n−1, where θ is to be determined. Then (32) and (34) imply
an−1 − p+ θε ≈ Wn−1((1 + θ)ε)
≈ Wn−1(0) + (1 + θ)εW ′n−1(0)
= an−1 − p+ (1 + θ)εrn−1(0) .
The equality used Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition 1, and rn−1(0) is the probability that
the consumer will purchase nothing when firms make exploding offers. Thus, θ satisfies
θ = (1 + θ)rn−1(0) . (35)
For a small ε, firm i’s fresh demand from those who visit firm i first will be reduced by
f(an−1)θε . (36)
On the other hand, the reduction of the buy-later premium will generate new returning
demand. Those consumers who find u ∈ [p + τ¯ − ε, a˜n−1] at firm i will search on first and
eventually come back with a probability approximately equal to rn−1(0). Since the length
of the above interval is (approximately) (1 + θ)ε, the returning demand is
f(an−1)(1 + θ)rn−1(0)ε . (37)
From (35), one can see that (36), the decrease of the fresh demand is actually equal to
(37), the increase of the returning demand. But each returning consumer pays more than
each first-time visitor (p + τ¯ − ε > p). Hence, the deviation is profitable. In other words,
in the buy-now-discount model, there must exist returning consumers in any equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4: We show that when firms cannot commit to the buy-later price
and consumers face no intrinsic returning cost, the following configuration is an equilibrium
when the demand curve is convex (i.e., the density f is weakly decreasing): (i) each firm
charges p0 to any visitor, where p0 is defined in (5); (ii) each consumer holds the belief
that a firm’s buy-later price will be the same as its buy-now price (even if she observes an
off-equilibrium buy-now price), and conducts sequential search accordingly.
Suppose firm i sets a slightly different buy-now price p and surprises the returning
29The consumer’s reservation utility at the subsequent firms may also change, but (33) still holds for a
sufficiently small ε. That is why we can regard the subsequent market as a no-recall market.
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consumers with a small premium τ ≥ 0, while all other firms charge the uniform price p0.30
Consumers believe that if they come back to firm i, they will only pay p instead of p+ τ .
Let Π(p, τ) be firm i’s deviation profit when it offers this alternative tariff. When p is close
to p0 and τ is close to zero, as with expression (12) above we have
Π(p, τ ) ≈ Π(p0, 0) + τΠτ (p0, 0) .
Thus, this deviation is unprofitable if Πτ (p0, 0) < 0. This implies that we need only consider
the deviation with an unchanged buy-now price p0 and a small buy-later premium τ . Notice
that this deviation will only affect firm i’s returning demand given that consumers hold
equilibrium beliefs.
We claim that firm i’s deviation returning demand is
n− 1
n
Pr
(
max
j =i
{p0 + τ , uj + τ} < ui < a
)
=
n− 1
n
∫ a
p0+τ
F (u− τ)n−1f(u)du .
To see this, note that if a consumer samples firm i last (which occurs with a probability
1/n), there is no returning demand from her and the buy-later premium τ has no impact.
Suppose now that the consumer has firm i in the kth position in her search order where
k ≤ n− 1, which occurs again with probability 1/n. In order for firm i to have any return
demand, a consumer must first reach the firm, which she does if she rejects all the previous
k − 1 offers (i.e., when previous firms provide match utility below a). Given that she
believes that firm i’s price will not change if she returns, she will leave firm i first if ui < a
and then come back if all other firms provide match utility lower than ui. Surprised by
firm i’s deviation price p0+ τ after she comes back, the consumer will buy at firm i only if
ui−p0− τ > max{0, uj−p0} since she can leave the market or go back to other firms. The
likelihood of this whole event is the probability term on the left-hand side above (which
does not depend on k if k < n). Summing all such probabilities over k < n yields the
claim.
Therefore, firm i’s profit from returning consumers when it increases the buy-later price
by τ is (p0+ τ ) multiplied by this returning demand. One can check that Πτ (p0, 0) has the
sign of
Πτ (p0, 0)
sign
=
∫ a
p0
F (u)n−1f(u)du− p0
{
f(p0)F (p0)
n−1 + (n− 1)
∫ a
p0
F (u)n−2f(u)2du
}
=
1
n
(F (a)n − F (p0)n)− p0
{
f(a)F (a)n−1 −
∫ a
p0
F (u)n−1f ′(u)du
}
.
30We consider only local deviations. Given that firm i has no profitable local deviation, it also has no
profitable global deviation if its profit function is quasiconcave in p and τ , for instance. Although in our
search model it is hard to derive more primitive conditions, we can show that it is true at least for a
uniform distribution of match utilities. Note that setting τ < 0 will only reduce each returning consumer’s
payment but not increase the returning demand since consumers observe this deviation only after they
come back to the firm and all of them value the product at ui ≥ p. Thus, the firm will never choose to
surprise a returning visitor with a price reduction.
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(The equality follows after integration by parts.) The first term is just firm i’s returning
demand in equilibrium, so it reflects the marginal benefit from each returning consumer
paying the premium τ . The second term is the loss due to the contraction of returning
demand caused by the unexpected premium τ .
Using the expression for the equilibrium uniform price (5), it follows that Πτ (p0, 0) < 0
if and only if
f(a)
1− F (a) −
nf(a)F (a)n−1
1− F (a)n <
1
p0
.
If f is weakly decreasing, (5) implies
f(a)
1− F (a)n
1− F (a) <
1
p0
.
So it suffices to show that
f(a)
1− F (a) −
nf(a)F (a)n−1
1− F (a)n ≤ f(a)
1− F (a)n
1− F (a)
⇔ f(a)F (a)
n
1− F (a) ≤
nf(a)F (a)n−1
1− F (a)n
⇔ F (a)1− F (a)
n
1− F (a) = F (a)[1 + F (a) + · · ·+ F (a)
n−1] ≤ n ,
which must be true. This completes the proof.
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